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Abstract: 
 
This study investigates the characteristics of the European non-financial corporations (NFC’s) bond issuers in 
the period 2004-2015. We find that bond issuers are significantly different from non-bond issuers; they are 
larger and older, and listed firms are more likely to issue bonds. Among listed firms bond issuers are more 
leveraged, but the difference vanishes as we consider the full sample. Investigating bond terms, we find that 
larger companies are likely to have more balanced maturity term structures of bonds.  
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Executive Summary1 
The recent financial and sovereign crises emphasised the need to further integrate the 
European financial system.  In particular, the overreliance on bank financing coupled 
with a segmented financial system affected corporate growth in an uneven fashion 
across countries, thus widening existing economic gaps. The European Banking Union 
constitutes a major step towards integration; the construction of the Capital Markets 
Union comes next in the policy agenda. In 2015, the Juncker Commission launched a 
vast programme of reforms with the purpose to enhance the European Capital Market 
Union. The Action Plan on Building a Capital Market Union mentions the easier access to 
capital markets across Europe as a major objective in the construction,2 and the first of 
the three stated objectives of the Capital Market Union is to “broaden the sources of 
financing in Europe towards nonbank financing by giving a stronger role to capital 
markets.”3 
This study aims at contributing to the Capital Market Union plan by providing an analysis 
of the European non-financial companies, which issue bonds. Bonds are debt 
instruments traded in markets, and constitute a traditional alternative to bank loans. The 
study investigates the characteristics of bond issuers as well as the respective bond 
terms, in the period 2004-2015. We use the databank of bonds published by Dealogic 
DCM, that we linked to Bureau van Dijk ORBIS to extract financial information about 
bond issuers. 
Our findings show first that the crisis led to a contraction of the bond amounts issued 
and to a shortening of the maturities; yet, in the aftermath of the crisis, riskier 
companies issued larger bond amounts. Second, bond issuers are significantly different 
from non-bond issuers; for instance, they are larger and older, and listed firms are more 
likely to issue bonds. Differences are comparable whether we consider the full sample, 
the sample of large firms, or the sample of listed companies. Yet, leverage is an 
exception: consistently with previous studies, we do find that among listed firms, bond 
issuers are more leveraged; the difference vanishes as we consider the full sample. Last, 
investigating bond terms, we find that larger companies are likely to have more balanced 
maturity term structures of bonds. 
The reports suggest a number of variations among corporations and bond terms over 
time, which should be subject to further analysis.  
                                           
 
1  The content of this report does not reflect the official opinion of the European Union. Responsibility for the 
information and views expressed therein lies entirely with the authors. 
2  Action Plan on Building a Capital Markets Union, COM(2015) 468, Brussels 2015. 
3  Commission Staff Working Document, SWD(2015) 183 Final, Brussels, 30.9.2015. 
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1 Introduction 
The financing of the European firms has been substantially impacted by the recent 
financial and sovereign crises. Yet, the adverse effects of the crises were uneven across 
countries, and a major source of such discrepancies was the persisting fragmentation of 
the European financial system. In fact, it turned out that among others the 
heterogeneity in regulatory and supervisory environments at that time substantially 
contributed to maintaining barriers within the European banking system and across 
capital markets. While such heterogeneity was initially aimed at adapting general 
principles to domestic rules of practice, they became a major obstacle to the European 
economic integration and the conduct of the unified monetary policy; the crises amplified 
the problem and revealed that reforming the European financial system was imperative. 
As a result, in the aftermath of the crises, the European Commission has launched two 
major programmes aiming to reduce financial segmentation within Europe.4 On the one 
hand, the European Banking Union has promoted a more homogeneous regulatory and 
supervisory framework among euro-area member states. Among others, the ECB has 
taken over the supervision of the 120 significant banks, and a Single Resolution Fund 
has been created so that the same resolution rules applied to all, with common funds at 
disposal. 5  By creating common rules and resolution procedures, the reforms have 
promoted both the transparency and the soundness of the banking system. 
In 2014, the Juncker Commission launched the second leg of the programme of reforms 
of the financial system, this time aimed at integrating the European capital markets. The 
so-called Capital Markets Union (CMU) Action Plan was enacted in 2015 and proposed a 
vast programme of consultation. The Commission Staff Working Document 2015.183 
states three objectives: 
[1] The CMU will broaden the sources of financing in Europe towards nonbank 
financing by giving a stronger role to capital markets; 
[2] The CMU will help deepen the single market for financial services; 
[3] The CMU will help promote growth and financial stability. 
The objective is thus to create a wide common capital market that facilitate access to 
capital markets to a larger range of firms at lower costs.  
                                           
 
4  The European Central Bank has also undertaken unconventional policies that temporarily balance the 
access to capital markets and reduce financial segmentation, e.g., quantitative easing and asset 
purchasing programmes. 
5  The Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD 2014/59/EU), adopted in spring 2014, entered into 
force on 1 January 2015.  
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By investigating the characteristics of European bond issuers and bond terms (amount, 
maturity and yield), this report intends to support the understanding of how European 
financial markets work, thus contributing to the finalization of the Capital Markets Union 
plan.  
The study focuses on non-financial corporates and makes use of micro-level data on 
bond issuances and firm characteristics in the period 2004-2015. In particular, we aim to 
answer questions such as: (i) How did bond markets in Europe evolve during the 
financial and economic crisis? (ii) What are the characteristics of bond issuers and did 
they vary? (iii) How do bond terms, i.e., amounts, maturities and yields, vary in function 
of firms characteristics? 
Bonds have been widely studied. A first line of research looks at the impact of accessing 
bond markets on the firms, and the characteristics of the latter. Authors find significant 
differences between bond and non-bond issuers. Using US data of listed companies, 
Faulkender and Petersen (2006) show that bond issuers are significantly larger, older, 
more profitable and leveraged. Bond issuers invest less in R&D, have lower growth 
prospects – measured with the ratio of market-to-book value of assets – and 
substantially higher return on equity. Bond issuers contract debt with longer maturity. 
Larger access to debt reflected by larger leverage ratio relates to transparency and 
friction costs. Using a similar approach, Harford and Uysal (2014) show that US bond 
issuers are more inclined to undertake acquisitions than non-bond issuers, and are 
willing to pay a higher premium, and extract lower returns on acquisitions than non-
bond issuers. The findings thus suggest that access to bond markets has real effects not 
only on the ability to undertake investments, but also on the overall profitability of 
investments. 
Another line of empirical research focuses on the timing of bond issuances, especially in 
relation with macroeconomic business cycles. Among others, Erel, Julio, Kim, Weisbach 
(2012) develop a multinomial logit decision model. In their model, firms can opt between 
bonds, bank loans, and equity.  The authors find evidence that the firm’s 
creditworthiness is a significant determinant of bond issuance along business cycles: 
non-investment grade borrowers’ bond issuances are pro-cyclical, while investment 
grades are counter-cyclical. Thus, access to bond markets is uneven through business 
cycles and varies across risk categories of firms. Also, the authors find that bond issuers 
are older and larger firms, with larger leverage and cash-holding ratios, and growth 
prospects. 
In their analysis, Campolongo, Cariboni, Hallak, and Rancan (2016) question the firms’ 
characteristics as a determinant of bond issuance, and conjecture that firm 
characteristics and bond issuance are determined by a common set of risk-related 
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factors. The authors construct a multinomial decision logit model à la Erel et al. (2012), 
and find the same impacts of firms’ characteristics on bond issuance as Erel et al. 
(2012). Yet, after endogenizing cash-holding, the latter has a positive impact on bond 
issuance; holding more cash improves access to bond markets. 
Even though bonds vary from banks loans in a number of characteristics, bonds and 
bank loans may substitute each other. Adrian, Colla, and Shin (2012) find empirical 
evidence that US firms which had already issued bonds before the 2007-09 crisis 
decreased bank loan new issuances in favour of bonds.6 Lo Duca, Nicoletti, and Martinez 
(2016) show that US quantitative easing has positively impacted the bond issuance 
volumes measured as the share of GDP. In fact, the total amount of dollar-denominated 
bonds issued by non-US corporations has increased substantially from $6 trillion to $9 
trillion between 2007 and 2015 (e.g., McCauley, McGuire, and Sushko, 2015; Bacchetta 
and Merrouche, 2015).  
Evidence on European firms are limited. Altunbas et al. (2010) investigate the financial 
characteristics that influence the choice of firms between syndicated loans and bond 
issues and find that bonds are the preferred source of funding by firms with more 
growing opportunities. Using a similar empirical framework De Almeida and Masetti 
(2015) document stronger difficulties to access the bond market for firms located in 
GIIPS countries (Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and Spain) than firms located in other 
euro-area countries. 
2 Data 
2.1 Sample selection 
In order to investigate the characteristics of bond issuers, we combined two datasets.  
First, we selected all bonds tranches issued by European non-financial companies in the 
period 2004-2015. We obtained bonds characteristics from Dealogic DCM. Dealogic DCM 
is the main provider of data about bonds primary markets worldwide. We selected all 
non-financial corporations (SIC code below 8,000, excluding codes between 6000 and 
6999) registered in any of the 28 country members of the European Union. The sample 
of bonds is made of 10,690 tranches, involving 2,205 unique bond issuing names, and 
1,498 unique ultimate parents; ultimate parents in DCM are current ultimate owner of 
the corporate group. Our sample is at tranche level, which enables us to use bond 
                                           
 
6  A similar result had already been reported by Kashyap, Stein and Wilcox (1993) using monetary policies in 
the period 1960-1989. The authors observe a shift from bank loans to commercial papers in time of 
monetary policy contractions. 
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tranches characteristics, e.g., amount, maturity, yield, issuance market, subordination, 
callability and collateralization. 
Besides, we obtained firms’ financial data in the period 2004-2015 from ORBIS. ORBIS is 
a comprehensive dataset of all types of companies worldwide, from micro to very large 
companies, published by Moody’s Bureau van Dijk. 7  The smallest companies in our 
sample of bond issuers had total assets above 10 million euros; we thus selected 
companies with total assets above 10 million euros at least one year in the period 2004-
2015. We are indeed aiming at comparing firms in their decision to issue bonds, and size 
is likely to be an exogenous constraint. Last, we selected non-financial companies in 
ORBIS (“industrial template”), and dismissed firms with SIC codes equal to or greater 
than 8000 (non-corporations) and between 6000 and 6999 (financial corporations).  
We restrained companies in ORBIS to parent companies. ORBIS provides parent 
companies at the 50% threshold. Yet, some firms held at 50% ownership or higher may 
still be stand-alone firms, e.g., publicly quoted family firm. We thus used the ownership 
structure provided by ORBIS and proceeded as follows. First, we dismiss any company 
owned by another industrial company if ownership is equal or greater than 90%.8 We yet 
retained the firm if the owner is a financial corporation since final owners may be a 
holding company or a fund that reports no financial statements. Besides, multinational 
companies sometimes register intermediary holding companies, which is in turn owned 
by a corporation. We control for such structure as follows. We first save the list of 
owners in our sample classified as Financial Type; we then collect the owners of these 
financial firms. We dismiss a firm if the owner is a financial company, and the latter is 
owned by an industrial company with 90% ownership. All details of our ownership-based 
selection are reported in Appendix B. Our final sample of ORBIS European non-financial 
companies includes 50,309 companies, and 420,648 firm-year observations (with 
available total assets). 
We manually matched the list of bond issuing firms in Dealogic DCM with ORBIS. 
Unfortunately, we did not find relevant numerical identifiers for the linking such as a VAT 
number. Therefore, we first run a name matching routine controlling for names, and 
then manually checked the automatic matching and completed the name matching 
manually. In the name matching, we first used the name of the company in ORBIS, then 
                                           
 
7
  In a recent survey of Orbis, Kalemli-Özcan et al. (2015) provides a detailed survey and quality check of 
the ORBIS dataset. 
8
  We did not use Orbis so-called global ultimate owners (GUO) for a number of reasons. First, the GUO 
controls for direct or total ownership above 50%, which we believe is excessively low. Second, we ensured 
that the type of the owner is indeed an industrial company, so that we retained companies who are owned 
by some other types of owners, e.g., “public market” and “family-holding.” 
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the global ultimate owner (GUO). Actually, name matching allowed us to further identify 
the ownership. We then dismissed bond observations with missing settlement dates or 
settlement date outside our sample time window 2004-2015, resulting in 7,570 
observations for which we could identify an Orbis identifier. The final sample for which 
accounting information are available includes 5,952 bond issuances, including 529 
unique firm names and 1,701 unique firm-year observations. 
2.2 Bond characteristics 
In this section, we describe the characteristics of bonds issued by European firms.  We 
first look at the distribution of bond tranches by maturity. Figure 1 is split in three 
panels: the number of issuer observations, number of tranches, and total amounts. In 
each panel we define four maturity categories: less than 5 years, between 5 and 9 
years, between 10 and 19 years and, equal or greater than 20 years. In our sample, the 
weighted average maturity of bonds – where weight is the bond amount – is about 8 
years, and bond maturities vary from less than 12-month to perpetual. 9 
Of all maturity buckets, issuers most frequently choose the 5-10 year maturity bucket 
and the largest number of tranches is also in this maturity bucket (2,371). Last, in face 
value, 46% of deals have a maturity between five and ten years. Generally speaking, 
86% of the deals report maturities below twenty years in face value. Shorter maturity is 
also frequent in terms of number of tranches (1,829; 30%) but much smaller in terms of 
amount (19% of the total amount). It seems that some borrowers specialize in this 
maturity since the share of issuers is also lower. Bond with maturity between 10 and 20 
years accounts for a slightly larger percentage (24%) in terms of amounts but a lower 
number of tranches. Last, bonds with longer maturity are less frequent and account only 
for 14% of the total amount issued.  
Figure 1: Bond Issuance by Maturity. 
 
                                           
 
9  Table C 1 in Annex C provides the distribution of the sample. 
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Notes: Number of issuers, number of deals and share of amount issued by bond maturity class. We consider 
four maturity classes: less than 5 years, between 5 and 9 years, between 10 and 19 years and equal or 
greater than 20 years. Source: JRC Calculation based on Dealogic DCM. 
Figure 2 reports the distribution of bond tranches by currency of denomination (Panel A) 
and by issuing market, i.e. the main market place where the bond is sold (Panel B). The 
majority of bond tranches are denominated in euro, amounting to 64% of the total 
amount in our sample, followed by the USD dollar (20% of the total amount issued), and 
the British Pound (10%). Other currencies cover only a residual share (see Figure 2 left 
panel). 
Figure 2: Bond Issuance by Currency of Denomination and Markets. 
PANEL A: Currency of Denomination 
 
PANEL B: Market of Issuance  
 
Notes: Number of issuers, number of deals and share of amount issued by currency of denomination (panel A) 
and market (panel B). The figures report the number of firm-year issuers, number of deals, and total amounts 
by currency of denomination of the bond tranches (Panel A) and of the market of issuance (Panel B). Market 
type is a code provided by DCM representing the market where the issue is sold. Source: JRC Calculation based 
on Dealogic DCM. 
Panel B in Figure 2 shows that less than 300 companies in our sample issued bonds in 
non-domestic markets, suggesting that only a limited number of companies are willing 
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or are able to issue in non-domestic markets (besides the Euro-market). The majority of 
the bonds have been issued in the so-called “Euromarket” (Panel B).10 Most of the bonds 
in our dataset are issued on the public market (80%) while the rest is placed in the 
private market; this confirms the limited role of private placements in Europe.11 
Figure 3 reports the share by sector of activity in ORBIS of the bond issuers. We 
construct sectoral groups as follows: Agriculture, Forestry, and Fishing; Mining and 
Construction; Manufacturing; Utilities: Transportation, Communications, Electricity, Gas 
and Sanitary Services; Trade: Wholesale and Retail; Services. Largest groups are 
Manufacturing, and Transport, Communications, Electric, Gas and Sanitary Service, 
which issued, respectively, 40 % and 44% of the total amount. Approximately 200 
issuers are classified in the Mining and Construction sectors accounting for 11% of the 
total amount. Other sectors accounts only for a residual part of the bond market (see 
Figure 3). 
Figure 3: Bond Issuance by Industrial Sector. 
 
Notes: Number of issuers, number of deals and share of amount issued by Industrial sector: Agriculture, 
Forestry and Fishing (0), Mining and Construction (1), Manufacturing (3), Transportation, Communications, 
Electric, Gas and Sanitary service (4), Wholesale Trade and Retail Trade (5), and Services (7). Source: JRC 
Calculation based on Dealogic DCM. 
                                           
 
10  Domestic bonds are bonds denominated in the national currency of the issuers, underwritten by domestic 
banks and sold into the domestic market. Foreign bonds are bonds issued in the domestic currency of the 
underwriters but the issuer is foreign. For instance, so-called Yankee bonds are bonds issued by non-US 
firms in US markets. Finally, Eurobonds are bonds structured domestically where at least 25% of the issue 
is placed outside. Eurobond markets are typically issued in London and traded in Luxembourg. Eurobond 
markets are over-the-counter markets, typically subject to few regulatory constraints; instead foreign 
bonds are subject to the same regulatory environment as domestic bonds. 
11  Private placements are subject to less stringent regulatory rules compared to public bonds, in particular in 
terms of information provisions, but also financial contracting and renegotiation. Private placement is a 
hybrid debt instrument between syndicated loans and public bonds. Because of the less stringent 
compliance rules, investors are mainly institutional investors such as insurance companies and pension 
funds, and hardly retail. In the U.S. private placement is a major debt instrument, particularly for smaller 
and riskier firms (Kwan and Carleton, 2010). The size of the private placement market in Europe is very 
restrained due to the smaller pool of financial intermediaries and a lack of regulation harmonization across 
countries. Lately, the European Commission has taken initiatives so to promote private placements within 
the framework of the European Capital Markets Union Action Plan (European Commission, 2015). 
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In unreported results, we find that about 51% of the tranches include a negative pledge 
clause. Negative pledge is a clause that disallows bond issuers to pledge current assets 
for subsequent debt, so that the currently issued debt keeps the seniority on existing 
assets with respect to subsequently issued debt. About 18% of the bonds are callable; 
callable bonds are bonds the bond issuer may repay before the maturity date. Finally, 
less than 5% are collateralized. Issuers indicate as intended use for the capital raised 
“general corporate purposes” in most of the cases. A limited number of deals is intended 
for restructuring or refinancing (11%), acquisitions (2.5%) and capital expenditures 
(1%). 
2.3 Bond markets over time 
We start our analysis by considering the overall amount issued by firms in Europe in the 
period 2004-2015. In Figure 4, we plot the ratio of the total amount issued by financial 
sector and non-financial sector over GDP (at market prices). The graph shows that 
financial firms rely substantially more on the bond market compared to the non-financial 
firms. With the financial turmoil, there has been a sharp contraction in the amount 
issued for both groups, but while most recently the amount issued by non-financial firms 
have reached or exceeded the pre-crisis level, the amount issued by financial companies 
has decreased steadily until 2015. The rest of the report focuses on non-financial 
corporations, and involves bonds for which we could match the issuers in ORBIS.  
Figure 4: Total Amount of Bond Issuance Relative to GDP 
 
Notes: This figure reports the share of the total amount of bond issued to the total EU28 GDP, in the period 
2004-2014. The short dash line reports the numbers for non-financial companies (NFC, left-hand scale); the 
long dash line reports the numbers for financial companies (FC, right-hand scale). Source: JRC Calculation 
based on Dealogic DCM and Eurostat. 
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Figure 5 reports the time plots of the average amounts issued over firm’s total assets 
and number of deals of all non-financial firms in our sample. There is an upward trend 
over time of both the total amount and the number of deals. Yet, there is a contraction 
in 2008, following the financial crisis. Still, in 2009, there was a noticeable increase both 
in the total amount issued and in the number of deals, but a new slowdown featured the 
year 2010. Indeed, new turbulences hit the European financial markets with the collapse 
of some banking institutions requiring state interventions (e.g. Ireland, Spain, Germany) 
and the increase in sovereign riskiness in other countries due to the high level of debt 
(e.g. Italy, Portugal and Greece). Brunnermeir et al. (2011) refer to the negative 
feedback-loops between banking and sovereign sectors with the term “diabolic loop” to 
emphasize how the fragilities between the two sectors were mutually reinforcing. The 
resulting economic recession become deeper in Europe with increased number of 
corporate defaults and high level of unemployment (see e.g., Bedendo and Colla, 2015; 
Boeri and Jimeno, 2016).  
Figure 5: Total Amount of Bond Issuance in Euro, and number of deals. 
 
Notes: The figure reports the average amount issued over firm total assets (dash-dot line, left-scale) and the 
total number of deals issued each year (dot line, right scale) by non-financial companies. Source: JRC 
Calculation based on Dealogic DCM and Moody’s BvD Orbis. 
Inspecting further the figure, we can notice that in the years 2012-2014, both variables 
have increased again.12 One possible explanation for this development is in the fragilities 
of the banking sector. Some European banks have extraordinary high-level of non-
performing loans (NPLs) and low profitability (European Central Bank, 2016), while at 
                                           
 
12  In 2015 the sharp decrease in the number of deals is due to the incompleteness of the financial data of 
companies, but there has also been a contraction in the amount issued in the complete sample as shown 
in Figure 4. 
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the same time facing tightening regulatory environments. Thus, despite the ECB’s 
unconventional monetary policy interventions (Cour-Thimann and Winkler, 2012), in 
some member states the supply of new credit to the real economy has contracted and 
consequently we observe a trend towards further capital market-based financing. This is 
consistent with Adrian et al. (2012). 
Figure 6 reports the yearly weighted average maturity of bonds, where weights are the 
tranche size. The curve shows that the average bond maturity nearly lost more than a 
third of its value from around 10 in 2007 to less than 7 years in 2008. The surge in 
volumes in 2009 is quite impressive (Figure 4), while the maturities are back to pre-
crisis levels only in 2013. The figures may suggest that volumes and maturities, to some 
extent, are determined by similar factors. 
The trends in the maturity may reflect the perceived risk in the markets. The sharp drop 
during the 2008 global financial crisis and the 2011 European second banking and 
sovereign crises shows that the market not only reduced amounts but also reduced 
maturities at a time of uncertainty. Many companies may also have waited for clearer 
skies, i.e., improved market conditions and higher precision in their own operational 
forecasts. The substantial increase at the end of our sample period is likely to signal 
positive developments of the debt markets. In fact, longer maturities mitigate roll-over 
risk for borrowers and also increase the duration risk for investors. The longer maturities 
might also be due to low interest environments and the demand from the markets for 
higher interest rates that are more likely in longer terms debt contracts. 
Figure 6: Average maturity of Bond Issuance. 
 
Notes: Weighted average maturities bonds issued in the period 2004-2014; maturities are weighted by the 
face value of the bond. Source: JRC Calculation based on Dealogic DCM. 
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In order to gain further insights, we refine our analysis of bond issuance amounts and 
maturities by looking at different groups of issuing firms; we split the sample by interest 
coverage. 
Figure 7 reports the average yearly bond issuance amounts to firm’s assets. For each 
company we sum all bond issuance amounts in a year and divide the sum by the total 
assets of the company, at the end of the year. Figure 7 reports the historical yearly 
averages (left figure) and the weighted average yearly maturities (right figure), where 
weights are the firms’ bond issuance amounts. The figure splits the sample in three 
terciles of interest coverage. The interest coverage is the ratio of earnings before 
interests and taxes to interest payments. The interest coverage ratio measures the 
firms’ capacity to pay interests on financial debts, and thus proxies for firm level of 
riskiness and financial weakness in the short run (see e.g., Harris and Raviv, 1990). The 
first tercile 1-pc is the group of firms with the lowest interest coverage ratio (the 
riskiest) while 3-pc is the group of firms with the highest interest coverage ratio (the 
least risky). The left panel of Figure 7 shows that in 2008 the riskiest companies 
experienced a contraction in the relative amount issued but an upward trend later on, 
markedly for those companies with a riskier profile (i.e., with an interest coverage in the 
first-percentile of our sample computed at yearly level). Looking at the average maturity 
in the right panel, we observe that lower interest coverages were associated with longer 
maturities. In 2006, the average maturity of top tercile issuers were about 9 years, while 
it was nearly 12 years at the bottom tercile. After the crisis the maturities converged 
around eight years in 2012. All sub-samples reduced their average maturities down to 
seven years. Low interest coverages may capture firms which report low returns for 
some years until they reach equilibrium; they thus need longer maturities.  
 
Figure 7: Newly issued bond average amount issued and maturity by subsample. 
PANEL A: Sample split by interest coverage. 
   
Notes: Yearly values of averages of bond issaunces: ratio of bond amount to total assets (left panels), and 
average maturity weighted by bond deal size (right panels). We split the sample in several subsamples using 
measures of risk and opacity. We split the sample in three terciles using interest coverage: he first tercile 
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group (1-pc) is the group of firms that report the smallest interest coverage, and the third tercile (3-pc) the 
largest. Source: Bonds details are obtained from Dealogic DCM; firms characteristics are obtained from BvD 
Orbis. 
Overall, the access of European non-financial companies to external debt in the period 
2004-2015 has been heavily affected by both the trends in the financial markets and the 
challenges faced by the domestic banking sector. Central banks have undertaken several 
policies such as quantitative easing and asset purchasing programs, which have lowered 
the nominal interest rates to zero and sometimes to negative bounds. The consequent 
compression of term and risk premium implies an increasing search for yields by 
investors. At the same time, firms are possibly trying to take advantage of interest rates 
below historical levels. A further element is the contraction of credit of the banking 
system that leads firms to use alternative source of funding documented by e.g., Adrian 
et al. (2012). Importantly, looking at the patterns in bond issuance over time in the last 
few years under analysis, companies, on average, were able to rely more on the bond 
market, including those that are riskier.13 This expansion points towards a deeper bond 
market, which may allow firms to grow.  
3 Statistical results 
3.1 Univariate analysis of issuers characteristics 
In this section, we investigate which of the characteristics of the firm determine bond 
issuance. We first report the univariate analysis of firm-year statistics of issuers and 
non-issuers in Table 1, which shows the differences between non-bond issuing firms and 
bond issuing firms, retaining medium and large companies only. We set the size lower 
bound as the lowest asset size of our pool of bond issuers. 
Bond-issuing firms are significantly larger and older. The access to bond markets thus 
seems conditional on establishing a reputation through a track record. Moreover, 60% of 
bond issuers are listed companies, while 6% of non-issuers only are listed.14 Due to the 
regulation of public markets, listed companies are subject to substantial information 
provision requirements. The share of listed firms among bond issuers exceeds by far the 
share of listed firms in the whole sample. In terms of performance, bond issuers grow 
more and invest less. Besides, bond issuers are more profitable (EBIT) but their interest 
                                           
 
13  Potential systemic risks and fragilities for the overall system should be limited by the market participants, 
such as institutional investors, which have well-diversified portfolios and can properly assess financial 
risks. Moreover, the terms of the contracts – e.g., maturity and collateral requirements – are additional 
elements, which need to be taken into account so to properly screen firms and differentiate the levels of 
riskiness.  
14  We report listed companies from ORBIS status, and control for initial offering and delisting dates reported 
separately in ORBIS. 
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coverages are lower. This may explain lower levels of capital expenditure. Regarding the 
funding structure, issuers are less leveraged than non-issuers.  
Table 1: Characteristics of Bond Issuers and Non-Bond Issuers. 
PANEL A: All Firms NO-ISSUER ISSUER Difference 
Age 3.055 3.665 -0.610*** 
 (0.893) (1.069) (-27.996) 
Size 11.510 16.127 -4.617*** 
 (1.238) (1.686) (-153.166) 
Listed 0.059 0.574 -0.515*** 
 (0.235) (0.495) (-89.632) 
Fixed assets 0.263 0.336 -0.073*** 
 (0.256) (0.227) (-11.719) 
Cash 0.083 0.084 -0.001 
 (0.126) (0.068) (-0.323) 
Growth 0.100 0.288 -0.189*** 
 (0.498) (3.256) (-13.147) 
Interest coverage 2.295 1.554 0.742*** 
 (1.815) (0.814) (16.047) 
Cash-flow 0.090 0.113 -0.022*** 
 (0.110) (0.062) (-8.314) 
Book Leverage 0.563 0.551 0.012* 
 (0.277) (0.178) (1.806) 
Capex -0.002 -0.032 0.030*** 
 (0.009) (0.034) (142.713) 
PANEL B: Large Firms NO-ISSUER ISSUER Difference 
Age 3.141 3.697 -0.556*** 
 (0.909) (1.060) (-24.564) 
Size 12.059 16.209 -4.150 
 (1.210) (1.613) (-138.141) 
Listed 0.086 0.582 -0.496*** 
 (0.281) (0.493) (-70.875) 
Fixed assets 0.279 0.334 -0.055*** 
 (0.242) (0.222) (-9.133) 
Cash 0.078 0.084 -0.005* 
 (0.114) (0.064) (-1.940) 
Growth 0.092 0.290 -0.198*** 
 (0.418) (3.293) (-14.172) 
Interest coverage 2.311 1.557 0.754*** 
 (1.778) (0.796) (16.484) 
Cash-flow 0.099 0.114 -0.015*** 
 (0.101) (0.060) (-5.993) 
Book Leverage 0.546 0.552 -0.005 
 (0.255) (0.173) (-0.822) 
Capex -0.003 -0.033 0.030*** 
 (0.011) (0.033) (109.681) 
PANEL C: Listed Firms NO-ISSUER ISSUER Difference 
Age 3.312 3.684 -0.372*** 
 (0.908) (0.995) (-12.487) 
Size 12.397 16.203 -3.806*** 
 (1.564) (1.601) (-74.487) 
Listed    
    
Fixed assets 0.269 0.312 -0.043*** 
 (0.239) (0.208) (-5.541) 
Cash 0.114 0.087 0.027*** 
 (0.130) (0.071) (6.498) 
Growth 0.103 0.317 -0.214*** 
 (0.449) (4.144) (-9.674) 
Interest coverage 2.083 1.632 0.450*** 
 (1.469) (0.734) (9.212) 
Cash-flow 0.094 0.115 -0.022*** 
 (0.108) (0.060) (-6.213) 
Book Leverage 0.483 0.539 -0.057*** 
 (0.233) (0.177) (-7.538) 
Capex -0.021 -0.038 0.018*** 
 (0.024) (0.034) (22.468) 
Notes: Bond issuing firms (ISSUER) are those which issued at least one bond in a given year; no-bond issuing 
firms (NO-ISSUER) are those which did not issue any bond in a given year. Variables are defined in Annex B. 
Source: Bonds details are obtained from Dealogic DCM; firms characteristics are obtained from Moody’s BvD 
Orbis.  
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Panel B of Table 1 focuses on large companies. We define large companies those 
companies that in each year satisfy the requirements of a large companies according to 
the EU definition. 15  We find similar results. Bond issuers are significantly older and 
larger, have higher profitability performance measured by cash-flows, but lower sales 
growth.  
Panel C of Table 1 reports results for listed companies only. Interestingly, the 
characteristics vary between bond and non-bond issuers in a similar fashion. For 
instance, bond issuers are older and larger, and report lower interest coverage. 
Consistent with the previous studies, we find that bond issuers hold less cash. While 
holding more cash reduces liquidity risk, higher levels of cash also reflects higher 
financial constraints (see, e.g., Bates, Kahle, Stulz, 2009). This is consistent with the 
prediction that bond-issuing firms are less financially constrained (e.g., Faulkender and 
Petersen, 2006; Campolongo et al., 2017). There is yet one noticeable difference with 
the full sample: consistent with Petersen and Faulkender (2006) the leverage of bond 
issuing firms is larger. 
3.2 Multivariate bond level analysis 
In order to analyse the determinants of bond issuance, we construct Model [1], an 
empirical model of the determinants of bond terms. 
Bond Term = Age + Size + Listed + Fixed Assets +  
Cash-Holding + Growth + error  [1] 
Bond Term is the dependent variable and is alternatively Amount, Maturity, and Yield. 
Amount is the share of the total amount of bonds issued by a firm in a year to its total 
assets. Maturity is a categorical variable of the bond maturity. Yield is the bond yield to 
maturity of the bond at the date of issuance. 
Explanatory variables in the baseline model are as follows. Age is the age of the 
company in years; we use the incorporation date provided by ORBIS. Size is the total 
assets. Listed is a dummy variable that takes the value one if the firm is listed in a stock 
exchange. Fixed Assets is the ratio of fixed asset to total assets. Cash-holding is the 
ratio of cash held by the firm over total assets. Growth is defined as the year-to-year 
sales growth. We replace sales growth with total operating revenues whenever sales 
growth is missing. We run alternative specifications including additional variables to 
capture firm riskiness. Interest coverage is the operational profits coverage of interest 
                                           
 
15  Number of employees greater than 250; and turnover greater than 50mln or total assets greater than 
43mln. http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/sme/facts-figures-analysis/sme-definition/index_en.htm 
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payments. In an alternative model we use two different proxies of firm riskiness, cash-
flow and book leverage. Cash-flow is the ratio of operating cash-flow to total assets, 
where operating cash-flow is defined as the net earnings before extraordinary items, tax 
and financial expenses, plus depreciation and amortization. Interest coverage is the ratio 
of earnings before extraordinary items, interests and taxes (EBIT) on interest 
payments.16 Book leverage is the ratio of total liabilities to total assets. Because we were 
afraid of some correlation with other variables, especially cash-flow and growth, we 
substitute Growth with Capex, defined as the ratio of capital expenditure to total assets. 
Last, errors are clustered at country level. Annex B reports detailed definitions and 
Annex C includes summary statistics (Table C 2) of all variables. 
3.2.1 Bond Issuance Amounts 
We first estimate Model [1] where the dependent variable is Amount. Because the 
variable is bounded between zero and one, we run the estimates using the Tobit 
estimation model. The results are reported in Table 2, Panel A. Panel B of Table 2, 
reports estimates of the same model using Ordinary-Least Squares (OLS) estimation 
method (log-normal model). Bonds may yet affect a firm’s characteristics. For instance, 
issuing bond may result in a larger leverage or a larger size of the company. In order to 
avoid such impact, we use prior year independent variables. All the models include year, 
country and industry fixed effects. 
The baseline model shows that age and size have a negative impact on bond amounts. 
Thus, while it is more likely that older and larger companies are bond issuers in a year 
(see univariate analysis), the overall yearly amounts are relatively lower for these 
companies. Larger and older firms are likely to issue bonds on a higher frequency basis. 
Presumably, smaller companies issue relatively larger bonds in fewer occasions, the 
rationales relating to cost and liquidity management. In fact, each bond issuance has 
fixed costs regardless of the size; and the fixed costs are relatively higher to smaller 
firms. Moreover, by increasing the size of individual bonds issuers may be attempting to 
increase the liquidity of secondary markets (Servaes et al., 2006). 
Fixed Assets show negative but insignificant effect on amounts. Listed is also negative 
with a statistically significant coefficient only in Panel B. Thus, transparency and 
recovery rates hardly affect yearly amounts. Growth shows a positive and statistically 
significant coefficient suggesting that higher growth companies are able to raise larger 
                                           
 
16  Interest payments are reported in a memo item in ORBIS; we replaced interest payments with financial 
expenses whenever interest payments are missing. We verified that financial expenses were close to 
interest payments whenever both were available. 
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amounts in the debt market. In Column (2) we add Interest Coverage, our proxy for firm 
riskiness. It exhibits a negative coefficient, which is consistent with the univariate 
analysis of bond issuers characteristics in the previous sections, however it is not 
statistically significant. 
Table 2: Determinants of bond Issuance Amounts. 
 PANEL A: Tobit Estimation PANEL B: Ordinary-Least Squares 
 (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) 
 Baseline Baseline+ Risk I Baseline+ Risk II Baseline Baseline+ Risk 
I 
Baseline+ Risk 
II 
Firm characteristics       
Age  -0.888*** -0.891*** -1.014*** -0.089*** -0.091*** -0.098*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) 
Size  -2.185*** -2.155*** -2.344*** -0.306*** -0.306*** -0.312*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Listed  -0.627* -0.910** -1.352** 0.015 -0.016 -0.025 
 (0.058) (0.025) (0.018) (0.759) (0.773) (0.687) 
Fixed Assets  -0.824 -1.112 0.155 -0.088 -0.128 -0.056 
 (0.385) (0.185) (0.836) (0.311) (0.163) (0.552) 
Cash-Holding -5.295 -6.890 -3.864 -0.731 -0.822 -0.659 
 (0.237) (0.100) (0.439) (0.232) (0.169) (0.276) 
Growth 0.090*** 0.086***  0.011*** 0.011***  
 (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000)  
Interest coverage   -0.034   -0.004  
  (0.920)   (0.939)  
Cash-flow    7.847***   1.302*** 
   (0.000)   (0.008) 
Book Leverage    5.028***   0.390*** 
   (0.000)   (0.009) 
Capex    -4.475   -0.721 
   (0.497)   (0.362) 
Fixed effects       
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
Constant 32.895*** 33.322*** 27.670*** 4.459*** 4.505*** 3.805*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Observations 1,433 1,328 1,475 1,433 1,328 1,475 
Pseudo R2 0.068 0.070 0.072    
R-squared    0.348 0.348 0.375 
Notes: This table reports the univariate estimate of bond terms where the dependent variable is the yearly 
total bond amount issuance over total assets. Panel A reports the Tobit estimates of the model; Panel B reports 
the ordinary-least squares estimates. Notice that in Panel B the dependent variable is the natural logarithm of 
the bond amount ratio (log normal model). All independent variables are lagged one period, definitions are 
reported in Annex B, p-value in parenthesis. Standard errors are clustered at country level. *, **, and *** denote 
significance at 10, 5 and 1%, respectively. Source: Bonds details are obtained from Dealogic DCM; firms 
characteristics are obtained from Moody’s BvD Orbis. 
In column (3), we substitute Interest Coverage with Cash-Flow and Leverage. Cash-Flow 
is the ratio of operating cash-flow (EBIT plus depreciation) to assets; it captures the 
ability of the firm to generate cash out from operations and higher cash-flow indicates 
the financial sustainability of the firm. Leverage is a static indicator of the ability of the 
firm to absorb adverse shocks with no effects for creditors. Also we replace Growth with 
Capex, the Capital Expenditure; Capex measures the ability of the firm to invest and 
grow. Adding the three variables hardly alters the previously described effects of other 
variables. In this specification Capex is insignificant at standard levels both in Panels A 
and B. Instead, Cash-flow and Leverage have a positive and significant impact in all 
specifications. Thus, firms with larger leverage and cash-flow ratios, but lower interest 
coverage, issue larger bond amounts. Bond issuers thus generate larger amounts of 
cash, access to more debts, and likely due to these larger debt amounts pay more 
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interests (regardless of the interest rate), explaining why coverage ratio is lower. Thus, 
bond issuers not only have growth potential, but also quite strong repayment capacities. 
Our results complement those of Faulkender and Petersen (2006) who found that access 
to bond markets results in larger leverage ratios. In fact, creditworthiness may be a 
determinant of bond issuance, rather than access to bonds as such. This deserves 
further investigation. 
3.2.2 Bond Maturities 
In this section we investigate the determinants of the maturities of bonds issued by 
European firms. Debt maturity is relevant to our analysis as it captures several factors. 
On the one hand, maturity is the result of agency and information problems. Creditors 
require shorter term debt contracts for borrowing firms with little transparency. Yet, 
excessive short-term debt amounts result in higher risk that debt is not refinanced when 
comes the maturity debt, the so-called roll-over risk (e.g., Guedes and Opler, 1996; 
Diamond, 1991; Myers, 1977). As a result, the companies facing market requirements 
for too short term debt are likely to maintain bank relationships instead, since banks are 
further capable of screening and monitoring firms. On the other hands, debt maturities 
may be driven by investors demand and the latter varies over time (e.g., Vayanos and 
Vila, 2009; and Greenwood and Vayanos, 2010).  
In this section we investigate the determinants of the maturities of bonds issued by 
European firms. We estimate Model [1] with maturity as the dependent variable. Firms 
usually issue bonds with tranches of different maturities and the relationship between 
debt maturity and some independent variables can be non-monotonic. Therefore, we 
estimate the determinants of maturities at the tranche level; in order to control for non-
monotonicity, we use a multinomial logit specification in which the dependent variable is 
a categorical variable that classifies maturities less than 5 years, 5 to 9 years, 10 to 19 
years, and 20 years or longer. The model specification is consistent with Guedes and 
Opler (1996). Explanatory variables are those in the model specification. Estimation 
results are reported in Table 3. Panel A reports the baseline model of the impact of the 
bond issuer’s characteristics on the bond tranche maturity. Because we suspect that 
other terms of the bonds may affect the impact of borrowers’ characteristics, Panel B 
reports estimates of the bond maturity model including bond terms at the tranche level. 
For instance, controlling for collateralization is more secured to creditors than the 
borrower holding fixed assets. Panels C and D report alternative specifications of the 
baseline model with risk controls. All the models include year, industry and country fixed 
effects. 
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Panel A in Table 3 shows that the impact of age is positive but insignificant on the 
likelihood that buckets with maturities longer than 5 years are selected. Size of the firm 
has a negative and statistically significant impact for issuing bonds in the buckets 5-10 
years and 10-20 years, while for longer maturities (+20 years) the coefficient is not 
significant. The results provide mixed evidence of the asymmetric information 
hypothesis,17 which would predict that larger and older companies can afford longer 
maturities.  
Moreover, unlisted companies are less likely to issue in the longer maturity buckets 
however the result is not statistically significant. Fixed assets, which should capture the 
amount of assets that debtors may collateralize, has no impact in this model. Companies 
with larger cash-holding ratios issue at the higher end of maturities (20+ years), 
suggesting that cash-holding reduces short-term and liquidity risk of the bond issuer. 
Growth has a negative and highly statistically significant effect on the probability to issue 
bonds in the buckets 5-10 years and 10-20 years, meaning that higher growth 
companies have access to the shortest segment of debt. Together, these findings 
suggest that short-term segments, in which interest rates are lower, are more accessible 
to larger and growing companies.   
Estimates in Panel B includes the following bond terms. Amount is the tranche amount 
which captures for potential market saturation. Two indicators Acquisition and 
Restructuring capture two purposes, namely acquisition and restructuring. Bonds aimed 
at acquisition are likely to bear longer terms maturities because acquisitions require 
time-lengthy combination of assets and synergies will need time to be effective. 
Restructuring is typically associated with longer maturities, which provide the debt issuer 
with longer periods to fix managerial issues. We also include two indicators of the 
existence of collateral and negative pledges. Collateral reduces the risk associated with 
bond; the negative pledge clause maintains seniority at par with subsequent debt 
issuance, and reduces the risk. 18  We find that bonds in the mid-range, 5-10 years 
maturity bucket, are less likely to be aimed at acquisitions, 19  but more likely for 
restructuring activities. Collateralized bonds are more likely to have longer maturities 
while the negative pledge has no impact.  
                                           
 
17  The mixed results may also be due to a restricted group of companies issuing a wider range of debt 
maturities in the attempt to reduce the roll-over risk. This is consistent with the findings by Giannetti (2015). 
Using survey data of European firms, she studies the level of specialization of debt and finds that small and 
young firms have a more concentrated debt structure. 
18 Negative pledge disallows bond issuers to grant equal or greater seniority on their assets to subsequently 
issued debt. 
19 Yet the coefficient is no more statistically significant in Panels C and D. 
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Table 3: Determinants of bond maturity. 
 PANEL A: Bond Maturity Model,  
Baseline  
PANEL B: Bond Maturity Model,  
Baseline + Bond details 
PANEL C: Bond Maturity Model,  
Baseline + Bond details + Risk I 
PANEL D: Bond Maturity Model,  
Baseline + Bond details + Risk II 
 5-10  
years 
10-20 
years 
20+  
years 
5-10  
years 
10-20 
years 
20+  
years 
5-10  
years 
10-20 
years 
20+  
years 
5-10 years 10-20 
years 
20+ years 
Firm characteristics             
Age 0.040 0.047 0.211 0.001 -0.003 0.163 -0.012 -0.004 0.203 -0.027 -0.045 0.181 
 (0.071) (0.092) (0.231) (0.077) (0.109) (0.207) (0.067) (0.101) (0.171) (0.103) (0.141) (0.161) 
Size -0.465*** -0.409*** -0.223 -0.575*** -0.500*** -0.285* -0.551*** -0.496*** -0.217 -0.593*** -0.517*** -0.357*** 
 (0.076) (0.121) (0.146) (0.070) (0.127) (0.150) (0.068) (0.119) (0.138) (0.081) (0.116) (0.108) 
Listed 0.026 -0.097 -0.118 0.014 -0.122 -0.141 -0.049 -0.173 -0.066 -0.106 -0.217 -0.177 
 (0.144) (0.206) (0.187) (0.160) (0.207) (0.217) (0.162) (0.163) (0.217) (0.197) (0.180) (0.253) 
Fixed assets -0.459 -0.142 0.954 0.033 0.308 1.368** -0.247 -0.045 0.758 -0.637** -0.294 0.989 
 (0.306) (0.296) (0.807) (0.313) (0.332) (0.695) (0.319) (0.386) (0.636) (0.315) (0.266) (0.808) 
Cash-Holding 0.077 0.692 4.532** 0.030 0.660 4.528** -0.290 -0.011 4.229* 0.017 0.381 3.307* 
 (2.305) (1.737) (2.157) (2.537) (1.928) (2.143) (2.971) (2.380) (2.495) (2.111) (2.039) (1.912) 
Growth -0.021*** -0.024*** -0.336 -0.012*** -0.016** -0.472 -0.011** -0.014** -0.545    
 (0.006) (0.007) (0.338) (0.004) (0.007) (0.423) (0.005) (0.006) (0.504)    
Interest coverage       -0.237*** -0.284** -0.668*** -0.353 -0.937 -5.785* 
       (0.084) (0.117) (0.171) (1.787) (2.532) (3.069) 
Cash-flow           -1.405*** -1.582*** -0.601 
          (0.254) (0.540) (0.586) 
Book Leverage           -4.145 -0.033 -1.715 
          (2.548) (1.612) (4.913) 
Capex           -4.145 -0.033 -1.715 
          (2.548) (1.612) (4.913) 
Bond details             
Amount    0.471*** 0.417*** 0.309*** 0.447*** 0.402*** 0.293*** 0.446*** 0.398*** 0.359*** 
    (0.103) (0.072) (0.084) (0.101) (0.075) (0.085) (0.074) (0.041) (0.060) 
Acquisitions    -0.511** -0.405 0.621 -0.618** -0.389 0.595 -0.168 -0.098 0.678 
    (0.235) (0.262) (0.470) (0.248) (0.301) (0.550) (0.256) (0.308) (0.475) 
Restructuring    0.900** 0.611 0.179 0.917** 0.636 0.184 0.792** 0.449 -0.123 
    (0.403) (0.545) (0.531) (0.455) (0.603) (0.571) (0.313) (0.450) (0.435) 
Collateralized    1.598** 1.414 1.670* 2.634*** 2.637*** 2.785*** 1.435** 1.293 1.653** 
    (0.807) (0.982) (0.908) (0.881) (0.948) (0.706) (0.620) (0.839) (0.657) 
Negative pledge    -0.049 -0.153 -0.190 -0.018 -0.132 -0.214 -0.098 -0.197 -0.182 
    (0.079) (0.143) (0.336) (0.093) (0.149) (0.328) (0.113) (0.201) (0.391) 
             
Constant 8.976*** 7.659*** 2.315 8.487*** 7.281*** 1.990 8.932*** 8.012*** 2.558 8.881*** 7.777*** 2.223 
 (1.504) (2.109) (3.217) (1.433) (2.085) (3.091) (1.559) (2.167) (2.645) (1.848) (1.861) (1.896) 
             
Observations 5,069 5,069 5,069 5,069 5,069 5,069 4,755 4,755 4,755 5,579 5,579 5,579 
Pseudo-R2 0.139 0.139 0.139 0.162 0.162 0.162 0.170 0.170 0.170 0.165 0.165 0.165 
Notes: This table reports the multinomial logit regressions predicting the maturity of the bond. Variables are defined in Annex B. All models include year, industry and 
country fixed effects. The coefficient baseline is for issues which have a maturity of 0-5 years. *, **, and *** denote significance at 10, 5 and 1%, respectively. Standard 
errors are clustered at country level. Source: Bonds details are obtained from Dealogic DCM; firms characteristics are obtained from Moody’s BvD Orbis. 
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Panels C and D add risk controls to the baseline model with bond details. The interest 
coverage has a negative and statistically significant impact (Panel C), suggesting that 
less risky companies are more likely to issue medium and long-term debt. Evidence is 
similar using alternative variables for risk, but coefficients are not always statistically 
significant (Panel D). Like growth, capex is negative and the impact is statistically 
insignificant. 
Overall, companies with growth potential and the ability to repay have access to a larger 
spectrum of maturities, from short to very long-term debt. This is consistent with the 
previous evidence suggesting that some issuers access the bond market on a relatively 
frequent basis.  
3.2.3 Bond Yields 
Finally, we use ordinary-least squares estimates to investigate the relationship between 
borrowing costs and firm characteristics. The results are reported in  
Table 4. Column (1) reports the estimates of the baseline specification for Model [1]. 
Column (2) reports estimates of the baseline, controlling for the characteristics of the 
deals. Columns (3) and (4) control for risk factors as described in the previous sections. 
All the models include year-currency, country and industry fixed effects. 
The results provide evidence of the relationship between firms’ characteristics and bond 
yields. First, firm size and the share of fixed assets have a negative impact on bond 
yields, at the 1% significance level in all four specifications. Age has a negative impact, 
significant only in column (3), at the 10% level. All three indicators reflect transparency; 
fixed assets may also capture the size of collateral. This is consistent with standard risk 
evaluation theories, which predict that the higher the transparency and the recovery 
rate, the lower the interest rates. The other firm variables have the expected signs but 
they do not reach statistical significance. 
Adding bond characteristics to the Baseline Model (Column 2) does not alter the 
respective impacts of the firm’s characteristics. Debt Maturity and Restructuring have 
positive impacts, significant at standard levels. Two bond clauses that control for risk-
taking after the bond is signed, namely Collateralized and Negative Pledge have 
significant impacts on bond yields, respectively positive and negative. Collateral aims at 
reducing risk but is against manager independence of decision. In fact, collateralized 
assets cannot be divested. Thus, worthier firms would rather avoid the collateralization 
of their assets, and collaterals proxy for riskier firms. The results are consistent with the 
hypothesis that riskier bonds should further remunerate bond-holders. The impacts of 
the deal characteristics are robust to the inclusion of riskiness indicators (columns 3 and 
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4). Higher Interest Coverage (column 3), and larger Cash Flows (column 4) have a 
negative impact on yields. The Growth proxy has a negative impact, but only Capex is 
statistically significant (column 4).  The relationship between bond yield and firm 
characteristics were mostly in line with our expectations. 
Table 4: Determinants of Bond Yields. 
Yield model      
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Baseline Baseline +  
Bond details  
Baseline+ Bond 
details + Risk I 
Baseline+ Bond 
details + Risk II 
Firm characteristics     
Age -0.124 -0.088 -0.082* -0.058 
 (0.102) (0.061) (0.041) (0.071) 
Size -0.321*** -0.280*** -0.221*** -0.291*** 
 (0.053) (0.050) (0.045) (0.055) 
Listed -0.162 -0.115 -0.103 -0.203 
 (0.199) (0.156) (0.150) (0.122) 
Fixed assets -1.544*** -1.434*** -1.328*** -1.695*** 
 (0.250) (0.175) (0.217) (0.300) 
Cash-Holding 0.301 0.548 0.379 0.652 
 (1.027) (0.959) (1.166) (0.895) 
Growth -0.011 -0.010 -0.008  
 (0.008) (0.006) (0.006)  
Interest coverage   -0.334***  
   (0.063)  
Cash-flow    -3.201*** 
    (0.912) 
Book Leverage    0.353 
    (0.302) 
Capex    -6.169*** 
    (1.089) 
Bond details     
Amount  0.036 0.021 0.057 
  (0.041) (0.043) (0.044) 
Maturity  0.484*** 0.456*** 0.457*** 
  (0.110) (0.099) (0.108) 
Acquisitions  0.202 0.247 0.375** 
  (0.118) (0.146) (0.147) 
Restructuring  0.861*** 0.717*** 0.941*** 
  (0.196) (0.190) (0.190) 
Collateralized  1.177*** 0.947*** 1.039*** 
  (0.304) (0.276) (0.286) 
Negative pledge  -0.346*** -0.376*** -0.373*** 
  (0.106) (0.088) (0.092) 
Fixed effects     
Year-Currency Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Constant 10.279*** 8.267*** 8.177*** 9.801*** 
 (1.131) (0.915) (0.798) (1.301) 
     
Observations 3,631 3,631 3,410 3,950 
R-squared 0.434 0.507 0.531 0.512 
Notes: This table reports the model of bond yield. In all specifications, the dependent variable is the bond yield 
at issuance. Explanatory variables are defined in Annex B. All specifications include Year-Currency, Industry, 
and Country fixed effects, and standard errors are clustered at country level. *, **, and *** denote significance 
at 10, 5 and 1%, respectively. Source: Bonds details are obtained from Dealogic DCM; firms characteristics are 
obtained from Moody’s BvD Orbis.  
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4 Conclusions 
This report investigates the characteristics of the European bond issuing non-financial 
companies. There are three takeaways. 
First, time trend graphics show that the crisis has a significant impact in the bond 
market leading to a contraction on the amount issued and shortening the bond maturity. 
After the crisis, the debt markets have shown some positive developments, with even 
riskier companies issuing large amounts. 
Second, the univariate analysis shows that the determinants of bond issuers are 
significantly similar whether we look at the full sample, the sample of large firms, or the 
sample of listed firms. A major exception lies in leverage ratios. Access to bond markets 
is traditionally considered to reduce debt market frictions. Both further information 
provision and the existence of market prices decrease information asymmetries issues. 
As a result, previous studies find evidence that bond issuers hold larger leverage ratios. 
Remarkably, we find the same result in our sample of listed companies, while it is 
significantly smaller in the full sample of companies. This deserves further investigation. 
Last, we conduct a multivariate analysis of the determinants of bond terms. We define 
bond terms alternatively as the total amount of bonds issued in a year to assets, the 
maturity of the bonds, and the bond yield. The results suggest that some of the features 
that were determinants of being a bond issuing company, e.g., age and size, have a 
negative impact on bond amounts. Relationship between firm variables and maturities is 
non-linear thus larger companies are likely to have more balanced maturity term 
structures of bonds, which allows them to issue smaller yearly amounts on average. 
Instead, smaller companies, which face fixed issuing cost that are larger compared to 
their assets, issue new bonds on a less frequent basis. Unbalanced term structure of 
debt may trigger major problems in times of financing disruption.  
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Annex A: Ownership-based rules of selection of firms 
ORBIS reports “direct” and “total” ownership, as well as the type and SIC code of the 
owner.  Direct ownership reports the ownership at the first level. Total ownership would 
consolidate all possible ownership up to 10 levels. Our selection is based on “direct” 
ownership only. Here are our ownership-based selection rules. 
1. Drop any company, which is “directly” owned by an “industrial company”, and 
ownership is larger than 90%; 
2. In the sub-sample, make the list of owners of type “financial company”, and with 
ownership larger than 90%; 
3. From ORBIS, download the ownership structure of the “financial companies” in 
the newly constructed list; 
4. Flag the financial companies in the list that are “owned” by another industrial 
company, and with ownership larger than 90%; 
5. Drop any industrial company in the sample with flagged financial company 
owners, and with ownership larger than 90%. 
 
Example 1:  
Firm A is a European company that owns Firm B at 95% and is owned by a family 
holding A. Firm B is dropped (rule 1). We keep Firm A (Rule 1.) Due to our selection, 
Family A is not in our sample. 
 
 
 
 
Example 2:  
Firm B is a US financial company that owns Firm B at 95% and is owned by an industrial 
company A. Based on initial selection rules, Firms A and B are not in our sample.  Firm C 
is kept under ownership selection step 1, but dropped after steps 2-4. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Firm A 
Europe 
Industrial Company 
In our sample 
Firm B  
Europe 
Industrial Company 
In our sample 
95% 
Family A 
Europe 
Family Holding 
Not in our sample 
100% 
Firm B 
US  
Financial Company 
Not in our sample 
 
Firm C  
Europe 
Industrial Company 
In our sample 
95% 
Firm A 
US 
Industrial Company 
Not in our sample 
100% 
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Annex B: Definition of Variables 
 
Variable Definition 
Firm characteristics Source: ORBIS. 
Dependent variable  
Amount  Total amount issued /Assets (%) 
Independent variables  
Age Natural logarithm of the age of the firm. Age is calculated as the difference 
between the year of observation and the year of incorporation. 
Size Logarithm of total assets in million euros. 
Listed Listed companies. We controlled for IPO and delisting years if reported in ORBIS. 
Fixed assets Total fixed assets, tangible and intangible assets, to total assets. 
Cash-holdings Cash held by the firm; Cash-holdings/Assets. 
Growth Prior three years sales growth average; we replace with turnover growth if 
missing. 
Interest coverage Operational profits coverage of interest payments; ln[1+EBIT/Interest Payments] 
Cash-flow Operational cash-flow to total assets; (EBIT + depreciation)/Total Assets 
Book leverage Leverage, including non-financial liabilities; Total liabilities/total assets 
Capex Capital expenditure to total assets 
Bond details Source: DCM Dealogic. 
Dependent variables  
Tranche maturity Categorical variable which takes value 1 for a tranche with maturity less than 5 
years, 2 between 5 and 9 years, 3 between 10 and 19 years, and 4 if equal or 
greater than 20 years 
Yield Yield to maturity of the bond 
Independent variables  
Amount Logarithm of the tranche amount  
Acquisitions Purpose of the tranche is to finance acquisitions 
Restructuring Tranche purpose is restructuring of previous bond 
Collateralized Tranche is collateralized 
Negative pledge Tranche includes negative pledge clause 
Maturity debt Logarithm of maturity of the tranche 
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Annex C: Sample Description 
 
Table C 1: Sample distribution. 
Year 
Number of 
Issuers 
Number of 
Deals 
Number of 
Tranches 
Number of Deals 
per Issuer 
Number of 
Tranches per Issuer 
Number of 
tranches 
2004 93 319 351 3.430 3.774 1.239 
2005 104 335 368 3.221 3.538 1.234 
2006 103 393 455 3.816 4.417 1.396 
2007 102 339 410 3.324 4.020 1.600 
2008 91 413 462 4.538 5.077 1.255 
2009 154 546 654 3.545 4.247 1.517 
2010 147 334 407 2.272 2.769 1.452 
2011 151 419 504 2.775 3.338 1.452 
2012 215 618 767 2.874 3.567 1.600 
2013 241 595 714 2.469 2.963 1.499 
2014 244 540 681 2.213 2.791 1.728 
2015 56 143 179 2.554 3.196 1.670 
Total  1701 4994 5952       
Notes: This table displays yearly figures of the the number of issuers, the number of deals, the number of 
tranches, the average number of deals per issuer, the average number of tranches per issuer, and the average 
number of tranches per deal. Source: JRC Calculation based on Dealogic DCM.  
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Table C 2: Summary statistics.  
 
Number of 
Observations 
Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
5% 50% 95% 
Firm characteristics       
Dependent variable       
Amount (%) 1,683 7.478 8.142 0.805 5.109 22.527 
Independent variables       
Age 1,690 3.665 1.069 1.792 3.892 4.997 
Size 1,701 16.127 1.686 13.162 16.187 18.697 
Listed 1,701 0.574 0.495 0.000 1.000 1.000 
Fixed assets 1,701 0.336 0.227 0.044 0.295 0.773 
Cash-holdings 1,695 0.084 0.068 0.009 0.070 0.200 
Growth 1,486 0.288 3.256 -0.174 0.040 0.356 
Interest coverage 1,545 1.554 0.814 0.262 1.499 2.874 
Cash-flow 1,666 0.113 0.062 0.028 0.105 0.227 
Book leverage 1,681 0.551 0.178 0.301 0.545 0.803 
Capex 1,701 -0.032 0.034 -0.094 -0.026 0.000 
Bond details      
Dependent variables       
Tranche maturity 5,952 2.078 0.932 1.000 2.000 4.000 
Yield 4,189 4.360 1.967 1.353 4.258 7.952 
Independent variables       
Amount 5,952 5.120 1.330 2.892 5.251 6.908 
Acquisitions 5,952 0.028 0.166 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Restructuring 5,952 0.110 0.313 0.000 0.000 1.000 
Collateralized 5,952 0.041 0.198 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Negative pledge 5,952 0.509 0.500 0.000 1.000 1.000 
Maturity debt 5,952 1.825 0.877 0.405 1.792 3.401 
Notes: The table reports summary ststistics of the main variables in the report. Statistics are the number of 
observations, the mean values, the standard deviations, the value at the 5% percentile, the 50% percentile 
(median) and at the 95% percentile. Variables are defined in Annex B. The sample period ranges from 2004 to 
2015. Source: Bonds details are obtained from Dealogic DCM; firms characteristics are obtained from Moody’s 
BvD Orbis.  
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